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This article analyses the principal complex 
of economic and political motivations of the 
states of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
EU members related to the EU enlargement 
towards the East. Special attention is paid to 
the discussion on the reasonableness of the EU 
enlargement and the positions of certain EU 
members. 
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The fifth wave of the EU enlargement differed qualitatively from the 
previous ones and exhibited a number of specific features1. Firstly, all previ-
ous negotiations on integration were held with one, two or three states at a 
time. Eastern European enlargement was conducted at a larger scale: 10 coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) planned to accede to the EU2. Sec-
ondly, the processes of the previous enlargement and further integration in-
terchanged, whereas during the fifth wave (which terminated in 2004), they 
occurred simultaneously. Thus the fifth wave of enlargement is often called 
a double enlargement. Thirdly, during the precious enlargement countries, 
acceding to the EU, had a similar socioeconomic level of development and a 
similar political model. The fifth enlargement involved relatively backward 
(in terms of their economy) countries and, moreover the states earlier be-
longing to the socialist camp and undergoing the process of system trans-
formation at the time of enlargement [24; 25].The economic differences and 
the differences in the sectoral structure of GDP were quite significant. 
According to the data obtained by researchers from the Kiel Institute for 
the World Economy, GDP per capita compared with the EU average ranged 
in the enlargement countries from 23 % in Bulgaria to 68 % in Slovenia. If, 
in EU-15 (i. e. 15 EU states), agriculture accounted for 2.3 % of GDP, in the 
fifth enlargement countries its share was much higher and ranged from 3.9 %  
in Slovenia and 5.5 % in the Czech Republic to 21/1 % in Bulgaria and 40 % 
                                                     
1 Russian and international historiography traditionally distinguishes five waves of 
EU enlargement: 1973 – the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK to the EU, 
1981 – that of Greece, 1986 – Spain and Portugal, 1995 – Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden; 2004 – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. However, some scholars identify four waves of 
EU enlargement, distinguishing the so called “Southern enlargement” uniting 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain [26, р. 56—70]. 
2 Sometimes, this stage of enlargement is called 10+2 in view of the fact that the 
enlargement states were represented by 10 CCE countries (Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, the three Baltic Republics 
– Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are traditionally included in this category) and two 
Mediterranean countries –Malta and Cyprus. 
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in Romania. In its turn, the service industry averaged 67 % of GDP in the EU 
in comparison with 41.7 % in Romania and 53.7 % in the Czech Republic. 
The share of heavy and mining industries was very high and reached, in 
terms of gross value added 30.7 % in the Czech Republic and more than 
40 % in Romania [14]. 
Market reforms, including privatisation and the banking system reform, 
had not been completed in the candidate-countries before their accession. 
That is why the economic effect of CEE countries’ accession to the EU 
proved to be limited: alongside a one-third increase in the total number of 
the EU population, the GDP growth in the EU amounted, according to dif-
ferent estimates, from 5 to 8 % [13; 16; 22]. 
According to the European Commission, out of 105 mln population of 
CEE countries, 98 mln resided in the areas where GDP per capita did not 
exceed 75 % of the EU average. Thus, in effect, the EU enlargement created 
a new group of countries, in which the average income did not exceed 40 % 
of the EU average [17]. 
The aspiration of the fifth enlargement states to participate in the EU en-
largement processes was a result of economic and political considerations. 
From the economic point of view, the existence of a strong and economically 
developed core structure in the EU ensured welfare growth in CEE states. 
Obviously, they counted on a massive financial support for socioeconomic 
reforms carried out in the process of their economy restructuring and the 
transition from the planned-administrative model to market economy. 
According to K. Voronov, L. Medvedev, and A. Sindeev, experts on in-
ternational history, EU integration was dominated by political interests of the 
enlargement states. First of all, it was manifested in the implementation of 
the existential idea of a return to Europe [3; 10]. Europe is associated in the 
consciousness of Eastern European states with the antebellum pre-socialist 
development of these countries. So, as the Romanian ex-minister of foreign 
affairs, Andrei Pleşu, said, for Eastern Europeans Europe is, first of all, a 
symbol, a symbol of the past. In Prague, Budapest, Belgrade or Bucharest, in 
Krakow or Sofia, the word Europe evokes dual associations: on the one 
hand, Europe means a normal state of affairs preceding communist totalitari-
anism; on the other hand, Europe means life before war, the aggregate of 
everything that made up “good old days” [2, p. 81]. 
The existence within the Warsaw Treaty military-political bloc and the 
socialist economic model over a long period of time were perceived by CEE 
countries as an imposed form of cooperation, or, according to Václav Havel, 
last president of Czechoslovakia, „antique forcible robes“ [10, p. 25]. 
The disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the changes in the geopolitical 
situation in Europe opened up an opportunity for the states of the Central 
Eastern region to “return” to Europe. In his speech delivered to the European 
Council in Strasbourg in January 1990, the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, stressed that Europe was experiencing difficult times. The half 
of the continent that had been separated for almost 50 years from its original 
life source wanted to return to it. Perhaps, one should not talk about a second 
inclusion but rather about the restoration of the Europe that ceased to exist 
after the Yalta Agreement [10, p. 24]. 
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Through integration into the EU structures, CEE countries aspired to es-
cape Russia’s influence to ensure soft security, since “today, the European Un-
ion is the principal guarantor of democracy both in its member-states, and the 
neighbouring countries” [7, p. 9]. Political leaders of Eastern Europe stressed 
that “in Europe we see all the values — motherland, freedom and human 
rights, we keep on indentifying ourselves with this Europe [10, p. 24]. 
On the other hand, integration into the EU gave an opportunity to increase 
their political heft within the world community, eluding the vulnerable role of 
buffer states between the West and the East. Apparently, that is why some 
scholars maintain that enlargement countries aspired to accede to the European 
Union not because of the prospective benefits but rather because of the danger 
of becoming isolated from Western European integration [24]. 
The motivation of EU member states for Eastern enlargement was also 
connected with a symbiosis of political and economic reasons. Despite the 
fact that the accession of CEE countries to the EU resulted in just a 5—8 % 
increase in the GDP of the EU countries, it yielded some economic benefits. 
It has to be noted that, as a result of the enlargement, the single EU market 
grew from 370 to 455 mln consumers, which led to a significant increase in 
the internal commodity circulation and the investment activity of EU mem-
ber states, a greater number of joint ventures in the CEE regions and de-
creased considerably the costs of trading operations. All in all, it was meant 
to accelerate economic growth in the enlarged EU: “the amalgamation of the 
old (and slowly reformed) and new (transforming and adapting to new chal-
lenges) Europe can give a major impetus for a more rapid development of 
the whole economy of the continent, as well as the modernisation of the Eu-
ropean model [15, p. 4]. 
However, it is obvious that the integration of Eastern Europe was, to a 
significant extent, politically motivated both for EU member and enlarge-
ment states. The location of the EU in the vicinity of the closed group of 
post-Soviet states having socioeconomic and ethnical problems and an un-
stable democratic structure posed a potential threat. The Eastern enlargement 
was considered an important factor of consolidation of democracy and sta-
bility in Europe. Moreover, the accession of Central and Eastern Europe 
made it possible to increase the political heft of the EU in the world and 
change its international status, strengthen its positions in a number of organi-
sations, including NATO, WTO, OECD, etc. Thus the Eastern enlargement 
was highly praised in the West: it was described as a victory over the “Yalta 
division”, whereas Jacques Santer (the chair of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities3  — CEC — in 1995—1999) called this process “a great 
event in European integration” [6, p. 22], “a gift to ourselves and the candi-
dates” [9, p. 363]. 
                                                     
3 The Commission of European Communities, European Commission: the first vari-
ant is used in the EU founding treaty. It became the Commission of European 
Communities after the 1967 Merger Treaty came into force. Today, the most widely 
used albeit unofficial term is European Commission [9, p. 211]. 
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The Eastern enlargement sparked off heated discussions within the EU, 
which continued throughout the accession process and demonstrated various 
approaches to the EU enlargement as such. Italy, the Benelux countries and 
Germany constituted the camp of optimists, being very enthusiastic about inte-
gration. One of the most ardent advocates of the Eastern enlargement was Ger-
many, which was dubbed by the Russian scholars, K. Voronov and E. Iordan-
skaya the “driver and engine of European integration” [3; 8]. German interests 
stemmed from the aspiration to strengthen the country’s position with the help 
of CEE countries. Their trade and economic flows were closely connected with 
Germany: according to E. Iordanskaya, in 1993—2000, German export to CEE 
countries increased 2.8 times from 39.9 to 112.6 bln German marks, whereas 
German import increased 2.9 times from 34 to 101.87 bln marks [8]. Of course, 
the inclusion of CEE countries into the common European market catered for 
German interests increasing Germany’s economic potential. Moreover, Ger-
many was an important investment partner of these states; consequently, the 
Eastern enlargement was capable of strengthening its investment activity. It was 
emphasised at the 1999 International Forum that Germany, which enjoyed close 
economic ties with the region of Central and Eastern Europe, will benefit most 
of all EU member states from the Eastern enlargement [8]. 
The United Kingdom and Denmark also supported the enlargement but 
for different reasons. Opposing the strengthening of the political functions of 
the EU, they hoped that the enlargement process will slow down the estab-
lishment of a political union and postpone the settling of this issue for an 
uncertain period. 
The following observation is of interest: the EU member states that ac-
tively supported the Eastern enlargement aspired to accelerate the processes 
of European integration in the course of their EU presidency. So, it was the 
1993 Danish presidency, when the principle decision on the possibility of 
EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries was made 
and the well-known Copenhagen criteria were devised. During the presi-
dency of Luxembourg, new programmes for providing support for the candi-
date countries in the process of their preparation for the accession to the EU 
were introduced at the 1997 Luxembourg summit. At the 1999 meeting in 
Berlin, one of the most acute issues — the cost of the forthcoming enlarge-
ment and the budget in view of the enlarged EU for 2000—2006 — was set-
tled. Finally, in 2002, in the framework of the Brussels and Copenhagen EU 
summits (during Belgian and Danish presidency respectively), it was an-
nounced that the negotiations with ten countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope on their accession to the EU concluded successfully. 
EU member states were obviously interested in certain enlargement 
countries: Germany supported Poland, Scandinavian countries advocated 
closer cooperation with the three Baltic states, Greece’s interests focused on 
Cyprus [19]. However, the Eastern enlargement was not supported unani-
mously by all member states. For instance France, which was generally in 
favour of the accession of CEE countries to the EU, was concerned about a 
decrease in its political influence in the enlarged Union and the strengthen-
ing of the position of Germany. 
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Spain and Portugal, which, after the accession of CEE countries, ceased 
to be the poorest EU regions, had all the reasons to be anxious that the finan-
cial support for the alignment of socioeconomic development through the 
EU budget would be cut down4. Spain even threatened to block the Eastern 
enlargement process unless certain guarantees of further financial support 
were provided [5]. 
Moreover, some EU member states that were generally in favour of EU 
enlargement were still concerned about the accession of post-Soviet coun-
tries to the EU, since their accession would increase the cost of enlargement 
for the member states in inverse proportion and, correspondingly, would 
have to increase their contribution to the EU budget. Naturally, this increase 
in EU budget contributions was opposed by the major contributors — Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and the UK. The beneficiary countries (Portugal, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, France), in their turn, were against any decrease in fi-
nancial payments5. 
Alongside financial issues relating to the enlargement, the EU member 
states were anxious about the efficient functioning of the enlarged EU. The 
need for serious reforms of EU institutions was obvious. Germany, in par-
ticular, advocated a stronger political structure of the EU. It caused a nega-
tive reaction of the UK representatives: the Conservative MP, Sir Peter 
Tapsell compared the German vision of Europe to Adolf Hitler’s [3, p. 65]. 
At the same time, the EU member states were concerned about their decreas-
ing influence as a result of EU institutional reforms, which suggested reduc-
ing the representation of the old member states given the accession of new 
members to the EU. 
It is the above-mentioned concerns that shaped the tactics of relations 
with CEE countries and affected the development of mechanisms meant to 
ensure the necessary level of development of the candidate countries prior to 
the accession in order to avoid the destabilising effect of the enlargement on 
the functioning of the EU. 
According to Desmond Dinan, the link between the enlargement and in-
stitutional reforms was obvious [19, p. 283]. On the threshold of such a mas-
sive enlargement, there was a need to change the quantitative composition of 
the European community bodies, as well as the voting system. An un-
changed voting system posed a threat to the functioning of the enlarged EU 
bringing together 25 member states — it was fraught with a decrease in gov-
                                                     
4 Thus, the 1992 Edinburgh summit reached a decision that the financing of the 
poorest EU countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) from the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Funds would be doubled over the next seven years. These 
measures were aimed at overcoming the opposition during the negotiations on the 
accession of poorer states [28]. 
5 Surveys show that, in 1997, the greatest concerns of the citizens of the member 
states regarding the enlargement process were triggered by the following circum-
stances: firstly, the EU enlargement was expected to be very expansive for the old 
member states (44% of EU residents; 52% considered it inevitable); secondly, there 
were well-grounded concerns relating a decreased in salaries (50 and 54% respec-
tively) [21]. 
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ernance efficiency and future inability when it came to making political de-
cisions on the voting basis. 
Discussions on the heft of the votes of EU member states exposed the 
existing disagreements between larger and smaller EU states. Germany in-
sisted on maintaining the majority of votes in the European Union; France 
aspired to equal representation with Germany. The French president, Jacque 
Chirac, presented the argument of one of the founding fathers of the EU, 
Jean Monnet, stating that equal representation of Germany and France was a 
sacrosanct and inviolable part of the French-German agreement at the first 
stages of integration processes. Federal Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard 
Schröder, refused to accept this point of view bringing up the demographic 
criterion, which is to be used in the qualified majority voting. Smaller states 
(i. e. the Netherlands) also demanded more votes [1; 12; 19; 21]. 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 solved the problem of institutional re-
structuring only partially. The agreement signed in Nice (2000) was meant 
to conclude the reforming of EU institutions in order to ensure its effective 
functioning after the enlargement. The agreement stipulated the composi-
tion of EU bodies, as well as the voting procedure and the application of 
the qualified majority principle. According to the Nice version of the 
agreement, the number of European parliament members was increased to 
732 people [11]. Germany succeeded in maintaining the majority of votes 
in the EU Parliament (99 votes). The UK, France, and Italy had to reduce 
their representation (from 87 to 72 votes). Smaller EU countries also 
slightly reduced the number of their representatives in the European Par-
liament [4]. 
Alongside the “optimisation” of the number of votes, the reform of the 
voting system took place. In some ‘sensitive’ areas, such as common foreign 
and security policy, taxation and migration policy, the EU member states 
reserved the right to impose a veto. As to the voting in the Council, the prin-
ciple of qualified majority was to be applied in two cases: when the majority 
of member states voted for the decision, or the decision was approved by a 
minimum of 232 votes, which accounts for 72.3 % of all votes (in the Coun-
cil, each country has a certain number of votes constituting the total of 
231 votes) [23]. At the same time, the four largest states reserved the oppor-
tunity to influence the results of the voting: the votes cast should account for 
at least 62 % of the total number of EU citizens. 
The second most acute problem for the EU member states was the fi-
nancing of enlargement. According to Heather Grabbe, “The impact of en-
largement on the EU public finances is a political issue rather than an eco-
nomic one. Ultimately, the cost of enlargement on the public purse depends 
on how generous the EU decides to be” [21, p. 33—34]. According to some 
experts, for the EU member states, the enlargement was not exceedingly ex-
pensive and, as certain estimates suggest, accounted for approximately 10 % 
of the total EU budget. However, from the very beginning of negotiations on 
the EU budget, some principal contributors — Germany, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands — adopted a rigid position deprecating any increase in contribu-
tions to the common budget. 
International cooperation: history and political science  
 48
The starting point for the solution of financial issues was the EU budget 
agreement adopted in 1999 in Berlin. According to this document, contribu-
tions to the common EU budget could not be increased considerably after an 
enlargement. In the framework of the 2000—2006 budget cycle, an agreement 
was reached that financial contributions will remain at the same level and will 
not exceed the established maximum of 1.27 % of the total EU GNP [26]. 
One of the mechanisms of reducing the cost of EU enlargement was the 
decision to deny Eastern European farmers direct payments in 2000—2006. 
Moreover, it was decided that the EU member states will receive financial 
support from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds at a level not ex-
ceeding 4 % of their GDP [21]. It significantly reduced the cost of enlarge-
ment (one should take into account that those projects should be co-financed 
by national governments, which limited the opportunities for the new mem-
bers to use financial resources of the EU). Thus, this principle became some-
thing of a compromise between the new and old member states, the principal 
and the beneficiary states. According to expert estimates, the new EU mem-
bers could count on receiving financial support at a level of 30 % of the total 
budget of the Structural Funds [20]. All in all, the total expenditure on the 
new member states, according to the financial plan approved in Berlin in 
1999 did not exceed 10—16 % of the total annual budget of the EU. 
The 2002 Brussels summit reached an agreement on the financing for the 
2007—2013 budget cycle, which eliminated the last problem the EU faced 
on the way to successful conclusion of negotiations on the accession of Cen-
tral and Eastern European states. The latter made it possible to announce the 
conclusion of negotiations at the European Council summit in Copenhagen 
in December 2002. The final document emphasised that “the European 
Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome 
the … division in Europe. Today marks an unprecedented and historic mile-
stone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession negotia-
tions with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia” [18, p. 8—9]. The first of 
May 2004 was announced the day of accession, which completed the grand 
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